Archive for October, 2009

A Few Myths About MOAA

Oct 30 2009

“Know thyself” – Socrates


Turning an Eye Inward

We’ve spent a half of a year examining some of the most pervasive myths that have hit the internet and news. From the harmless to the absurd to the dangerously partisan, the year has been rife with inaccurate information. But we have yet to address some of the misconceptions about our own organization that exist, even among our own members.


Myth – MOAA is Different Than TROA

In 2002, the Board of Directors proposed changing our name from The Retired Officers Association to Military Officers Association of America. The proposal was presented to the membership for a general vote and the changed passed by a vast majority of the membership (well over 80 percent of voters approved the measure). While we are sometimes confused with the organization The Retired Enlisted Association (TREA), there is no operational connection between our groups.


Myth – The Name Change Altered MOAA’s Focus Beyond Retirees

We decided to change our name because TROA never really reflected the true work we were doing in the first place. We have always fought for the increase in benefits and pay for not just retirees but also currently serving active duty and National Guard/Reserve officers. Our membership has, from the beginning of the association in 1929, been open to anyone that has held or currently holds a commission in the (now 7) uniformed services. Since having the word ‘retired’ in our name had a tendency to keep non-retirees, including not just active duty but also former officers, from realizing they are eligible for membership, it was a move based on practicality, not changes in focus.


Myth – MOAA Only Represents Officers

Although membership in MOAA is restricted to commissioned and warrant officers of USA, USAF, USN, USMC, NOAA, USPHS and USCG, our legislative objectives and mission are meant to support all members of the uniformed services, including enlisted personnel. Since changes to pay and benefit programs affect both enlisted and commissioned members equally, we are always on guard and pushing for improvements.


Myth – MOAA Contributes Financially to Congressional Members

Due to our non-profit status, MOAA is prohibited from making contributions to political parties and members of the government. We are a lobbyist organization, but are not considered a Political Action Committee. This goes hand in hand with the non-partisan nature of our activities. Although we have been accused in the past of being too pro-Clinton, too pro-Bush and now too pro-Obama, in reality we work with each administration and congress to ensure the best possible outcome in the National Defense Authorization Act for every member of the military. This means having to work with those in power, whether that is on the Hill, in the White House or at the Department of Defense.

Personally, after telling people that I work for a lobbyist firm, it is almost invariably followed up with the statement ‘not that kind’ and a smile. It is good to work on the right side of politics, and actually helping those that are most deserving and have made so many sacrifices.


True But Not Conducive for Future Operations – MOAA Will Work for Me Even if I’m Not a Member

While it is true that all members of the military benefit from the work of MOAA, regardless of their membership status, we are not funded by the government or by major corporate grants. While investments keep our operations afloat and provide a cushion for economic downturns, our operating budget is heavily dependent on membership dues and royalties from membership activity in our association’s discount partners (insurance, travel, etc.). More importantly, every member represents a stronger voice on Capital Hill. We may be One Powerful Voice, but to remain that way, it is imperative that our membership numbers remain strong. Especially with the high rate of loss of our older World War II generation members, the need for officers to join up has never been more crucial.

For these reasons, all eligible officers should help fight the good fight by joining MOAA. Stay informed, get involved, be aware. (There’s a handy little icon at the top of this page that will give you more information about joining, check it out)



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The CBO/TRICARE Email That Won’t Die

Oct 23 2009


BotB Verdict

“Myth is, after all, the neverending story.” – Joan Vinge


Such Long Legs This Has

The better to fool people with. What started as an impassioned yet unrealistic review of the Congressional Budget Office’s recommendations to President Obama has continued to gain traction in the email world. Although we’ve already discussed this subject twice in previous articles, some changes have been made in the language of the introduction and the email title, giving it new legs. But this doesn’t change the fact that the CBO report was a recommendation to the administrations that was flatly rejected, TRICARE and TFL funding have made it through the NDAA so far, and the Health Care Reform bill contains no language that would affect military health care.
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A War in Every Valley

Oct 19 2009

“بدبختها ها سرخود یاد ميگيرند، خوش بختها سر دیگران میبینند”
“Unfortunates learn from their own mistakes, and the lucky ones learn from others’ mistakes.”
Afghan Proverb

As referenced in last week’s article, the Afghanistan war is at an extremely critical stage, especially on the political front. This article intends to lay the framework of this debate by providing essential history, political analysis and observations on the current state of the war and its regional and global implications. It is not meant to imply a formal MOAA recommendation to the administration on the way forward, only to provide background on the road that lies behind and in front of us. While this will not be an article for fans of brevity, it will strive to be as comprehensive as possible.
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Three Myths About Afghanistan

Oct 12 2009

“The fabric of our collective will has begun to fray, weakened all the more by a series of pernicious myths that thicken the fog of war.” – Colonel Joseph Collins, (USA-Ret)


MOAA Life Member and National War College Teacher Helps Clear Up The Air

Last Friday, I had the opportunity to attend a seminar for journalists regarding Afghanistan at the Medill School of Journalism put on by Military Reporters and Editors and the National Defense University. With the current dramatic events unfolding politically and militarily over the future course of the war, the timing was excellent. Also excellent was the presentation by Colonel Joseph Collins, (USA-Ret), who is a current teacher at the National War College and a former deputy assistant director of defense for stability operations.

In addition to these accomplishments, Colonel Collins is also a Life Member of MOAA and graciously gave us the go ahead to share what he felt are three pervasive myths regarding Afghanistan. We thank him for helping the home team. Below are exerts from each myth. To visit the full story at Armed Force Journal, click here.


Myth 1 – Afghanistan is not a vital interest to the United States, we should withdraw.

Colonel Collins explains why Afghanistan is a crucial theater in the war against violent extremist Islam:

…Our mission in Afghanistan remains what it was in the fall of 2001. We must prevent the re-establishment of a terrorist stronghold there and defeat al-Qaida and the Taliban, who, if anything, have moved closer together over the years. Our methods for achieving our objectives include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and state-building. All are necessary. Those who think we can ignore Afghan needs while we use their country as a counterterrorism platform are naïve or shortsighted. Unless we create a decent, stable country in Afghanistan — not a Utopia — it may again be conquered by an al-Qaida ally, and the need for counterterrorist operations there will never disappear.

He continues to explain that Yemen and Somalia are unpredictable as bases for al-Qaida and that their best opportunity is to regain operational control of Taliban dominated Afghanistan and Pakistan.


Myth 2 – The Taliban are winning the war in Afghanistan. They can’t be stopped.

This type of reporting or propaganda encourages defeatism, according to Colonel Collins, and is not the reality of the situation.

The Taliban can be defeated and blocked by strategies that protect the population and build up the security capacity of the Afghan state, its provinces and its districts. Counter-sanctuary activities by Pakistani forces could easily disrupt their base areas and training grounds. Better coordination with Persian Gulf allies and stronger counternarcotics efforts could dry up their financial base. To win faster, we will have to fight harder and smarter, drastically increasing Afghanistan’s capacity to manage its own affairs. The truth is that Taliban forces have made great strides, but they can be stopped. The Taliban cannot win unless the West quits.

Defeating the Taliban strategy of outlasting the determination and will of the international forces is the best path to victory.


Myth 3 – Afghanistan has always been unstable and has never had an effective central government. Trying to build one is a waste of time and resources.

Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the nation was a much more secure place. It was even a tourist destination for a lot of hippies and members of the New Age movement.

From the early 1900s to the Soviet invasion in 1978, Afghanistan was a poor, but relatively stable, developing country. The government writ large — national, provincial, district and at local levels —was in control at home and generally at peace with its neighbors. In the postwar era, the country was courted by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, both of which during the Cold War provided significant foreign aid. It had a draft, a functioning Army and Air Force, as well as a significant Western presence. From the early 1960s onward, it had both a king and a functioning parliament.

Underneath the surface, however, the pressures for modernization and the pull of tradition and religion produced both leftist and religious extremists. In 1973, the king was deposed by his progressive cousin in a velvet coup. After a Soviet-backed, Marxist coup in 1978 — which the late anthropologist Louis Dupree characterized as “more Groucho than Karl” —the country spiraled rapidly downward. Even before the Soviet invasion in December 1979 to shore up its position on its southern border, the Afghan people were widely in revolt, energized by the need to deal with atheist invaders.

Since the Soviet pull out, the nation has experienced nothing but bloodshed, with a civil war leading to a Taliban government and the war with the United States.


Nation Building and Setbacks

While the bombings, raids and battles raging daily between the Taliban, al-Qaida linked forces and the international coalition grab all the press coverage, there has been a determined attempt to restore the nation of Afghanistan to its prior self-supportive days. But this effort is useless while Taliban and their cohorts are attacking bases, bombing embassies and threatening schools and government institutions that support the international coalition. As the White House, Congress and DoD discuss our next moves, these concepts should be clear.



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Classic – LCDR Fyffe’s 1870 Cross Country Walk

Oct 08 2009

“The wisest have the most authority” – Plato


A Myth, But a Fun One

Sometimes we stumble across old stories about the military that are virtually impossible to corroborate, but make for amusing reads. This story, about a lieutenant commander, J.P. Fyffe, details his exploits and attempt to make a statement about a bad policy that was in place at the time. In August of 1870, as the story goes, LCDR Fyffe was given command of a frigate stationed outside of San Francisco. The policy of the Navy during this era was that the cost of any move one had to make to a new assignment must be handled by the service member and then the costs would be reimbursed after they arrived. After LCDR Fyffe, who lived in Connecticut, attempted to get money for a train ride across the country and was denied, he decided to make the journey entirely on foot and report back to his ‘superiors’ his progress on a daily basis.
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