Three Myths About Afghanistan
Oct 12 2009
“The fabric of our collective will has begun to fray, weakened all the more by a series of pernicious myths that thicken the fog of war.” – Colonel Joseph Collins, (USA-Ret)
MOAA Life Member and National War College Teacher Helps Clear Up The Air
Last Friday, I had the opportunity to attend a seminar for journalists regarding Afghanistan at the Medill School of Journalism put on by Military Reporters and Editors and the National Defense University. With the current dramatic events unfolding politically and militarily over the future course of the war, the timing was excellent. Also excellent was the presentation by Colonel Joseph Collins, (USA-Ret), who is a current teacher at the National War College and a former deputy assistant director of defense for stability operations.
In addition to these accomplishments, Colonel Collins is also a Life Member of MOAA and graciously gave us the go ahead to share what he felt are three pervasive myths regarding Afghanistan. We thank him for helping the home team. Below are exerts from each myth. To visit the full story at Armed Force Journal, click here.
Myth 1 – Afghanistan is not a vital interest to the United States, we should withdraw.
Colonel Collins explains why Afghanistan is a crucial theater in the war against violent extremist Islam:
…Our mission in Afghanistan remains what it was in the fall of 2001. We must prevent the re-establishment of a terrorist stronghold there and defeat al-Qaida and the Taliban, who, if anything, have moved closer together over the years. Our methods for achieving our objectives include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and state-building. All are necessary. Those who think we can ignore Afghan needs while we use their country as a counterterrorism platform are naïve or shortsighted. Unless we create a decent, stable country in Afghanistan — not a Utopia — it may again be conquered by an al-Qaida ally, and the need for counterterrorist operations there will never disappear.
He continues to explain that Yemen and Somalia are unpredictable as bases for al-Qaida and that their best opportunity is to regain operational control of Taliban dominated Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Myth 2 – The Taliban are winning the war in Afghanistan. They can’t be stopped.
This type of reporting or propaganda encourages defeatism, according to Colonel Collins, and is not the reality of the situation.
The Taliban can be defeated and blocked by strategies that protect the population and build up the security capacity of the Afghan state, its provinces and its districts. Counter-sanctuary activities by Pakistani forces could easily disrupt their base areas and training grounds. Better coordination with Persian Gulf allies and stronger counternarcotics efforts could dry up their financial base. To win faster, we will have to fight harder and smarter, drastically increasing Afghanistan’s capacity to manage its own affairs. The truth is that Taliban forces have made great strides, but they can be stopped. The Taliban cannot win unless the West quits.
Defeating the Taliban strategy of outlasting the determination and will of the international forces is the best path to victory.
Myth 3 – Afghanistan has always been unstable and has never had an effective central government. Trying to build one is a waste of time and resources.
Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the nation was a much more secure place. It was even a tourist destination for a lot of hippies and members of the New Age movement.
From the early 1900s to the Soviet invasion in 1978, Afghanistan was a poor, but relatively stable, developing country. The government writ large — national, provincial, district and at local levels —was in control at home and generally at peace with its neighbors. In the postwar era, the country was courted by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, both of which during the Cold War provided significant foreign aid. It had a draft, a functioning Army and Air Force, as well as a significant Western presence. From the early 1960s onward, it had both a king and a functioning parliament.
Underneath the surface, however, the pressures for modernization and the pull of tradition and religion produced both leftist and religious extremists. In 1973, the king was deposed by his progressive cousin in a velvet coup. After a Soviet-backed, Marxist coup in 1978 — which the late anthropologist Louis Dupree characterized as “more Groucho than Karl” —the country spiraled rapidly downward. Even before the Soviet invasion in December 1979 to shore up its position on its southern border, the Afghan people were widely in revolt, energized by the need to deal with atheist invaders.
Since the Soviet pull out, the nation has experienced nothing but bloodshed, with a civil war leading to a Taliban government and the war with the United States.
Nation Building and Setbacks
While the bombings, raids and battles raging daily between the Taliban, al-Qaida linked forces and the international coalition grab all the press coverage, there has been a determined attempt to restore the nation of Afghanistan to its prior self-supportive days. But this effort is useless while Taliban and their cohorts are attacking bases, bombing embassies and threatening schools and government institutions that support the international coalition. As the White House, Congress and DoD discuss our next moves, these concepts should be clear.
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